A Coding Conception of Action-Directed Pragmatics by Kvart, Igal
										Igal Kvart
Posted: 30 December, 2018. Can be cited. Will not be changed. Modifications, if any, will be posted as a different entry.  
                    A Coding Conception of Action-Directed-Pragmatics 
Part I: Introduction
Section 1:  The problem of pragmatics: Implicit Content: How is its communication possible?         In presenting the so-called Action-Directed Pragmatics account below, I focus here, first, on a paradigmatic context/setup of a speaker S and an addressee D: S delivers an assertion Asi, with an explicit semantic (literal) content (which I take for granted here), and thereby conveys an implicit content:  The delivery of the implicit content is the pragmatic function of D’s asserting Asi. Pragmatics, as I take it, is the study of how the speaker, given an implicit message she wants to convey, selects her assertion (the explicit content), how her addressee understands her implicit message, and what the underpinning mechanism that enables such successful communication (when it is so) is.
   The core pragmatic riddle I will focus on is: How do we, as addressees, understand the conveyed implicit content, which has not been provided explicitly, and how, as speakers, do we manage to convey it? How do we choose a suitable explicit content to be asserted, via the assertion of which we will also convey the implicit content we have in mind? I’ll present my answer, which models how a speaker and an addressee perform these two functions, in a sub-domain of Pragmatics that I’ll focus on: Action Directed Pragmatics ( = ADP). The paradigmatic setup/context I’ll focus on is deliberative – an action-decision is impending and necessary. Speaker S has a Preferred Action A1, which he wishes that D performs. The pragmatic problem arises once we assume that S prefers not to convey explicitly a certain content he wants to convey to addressee D, and which he ends up conveying implicitly. This implicit content typically consists in the specification of S’s alluded-to action (or steered-to action; or targeted action see below -- his above Preferred Action A1),​[1]​ and in how S steers D to perform it (with various degrees of Steering). How does S select a suitable assertion that will also best convey to his addressee his implicit content? How is this implicit content conveyed to D by S’s assertion? And how does D deciphers it?
   Among the data S and D can resort to are contextual cues, or, more generally, what I call Setext. A setext is an ordered pair of a Setup – roughly, a world-chunk, and a Conversational Context.​[2]​ We attempt here to simulate D by finding a semi-formal function that deciphers the transmitted implicit content of Asi in the setext, given the information available to D, and also, to simulate S by finding a procedure for him to deliver a given implicit content by selecting an assertion he needs to find that will best convey his implicit content. The core of the implicit content in ADP is the specification of the steered-to action, and the remainder involves how S steers D towards performing the steered-to action. I thus focus here on implicit contents that convey S’s steering D towards a certain action.​[3]​
Section 2: The form of an answer         The key idea I develop here is that Pragmatics, at its core,​[4]​ centers on communicating implicit contents by coding – by Encoding and Decoding implicit messages​[5]​ via a coding mechanism  on a ‘coding platform’, using coded ‘intermediaries’. Language speakers possess linguistic competence for encoding and deciphering implicit messages conveyed and deciphered via inferences-types, which are part of Common Sense and which function as the encoding platform, together with the assertoric act which serves as the ‘delivery vehicle’, or an encoding vehicle, via which the encoding message is carried.​[6]​ Much of the encoding and decoding is done by S and D simulating each other simulating each other etc.  A major contribution is provided by relevant aspects of the setext in which the pragmatic communication is being performed, and part of the problem is how to specify the relevant available aspects.
   I will just note, but not engage here further with, the important phenomenon of ubiquitous routine pragmatic effects of a related sort that, in mature pragmatics, are presumably handled by sub-routines, or by ‘pragmatic dictionaries’, where a recognized ordinary pragmatic type of case has a standard answer (or reading) that can be routinely associated with it. In general, once a certain repeated type of a computational, and presumably also cognitive, problem has a paradigmatic solution, it can be ‘shelved’, classified as a computational chore of a fixed type, and employed by language-users, computers and machines without the need to attend to how the sub-routine is to be computed, once we fed the requisite initial data, as when the sub-routine lends itself to a simple representative short-cut function. In such cases, speakers and addressees may have a sense that the encoding and decoding tasks are ‘trivial’ – sometimes akin to certain cases where users have acquired a certain skill (e.g., walking, bicycle riding), which need not be trivial, but whose application via activation is close to trivial once acquired.​[7]​ Yet, as it seems to turn out, such processing of pragmatic communication, relegated to such a ‘pragmatic dictionary’, are ubiquitous. 
Part II: Overall Assertibility        Pragmatics deals with a variety of speech-acts. Here, for simplicity, I restrict my treatment to just assertions (actual or contemplated). A (or the) central part of Pragmatics engages not with Truth-Values but with assertibility (of assertions​[8]​ in a setext). This is especially prominent in heuristics we employ in Common Sense by way of inferences: In successful reasoning, we typically run assertorically through the premises and end up asserting the conclusion, thereby endorsing them. In a Practical Inference, by assertorically endorsing the conclusion (typically, an action-injunction) we indicate an (at least prima facie) willingness​[9]​ to act on it.  So first we’ll need to gain some understanding about assertibility (as employed here). 
   We possess gauging abilities for telling what is assertible by us (or by others) in a setext in the light of operative norms (e.g., epistemic, instrumental, ethical) and our pertinent epistemic position, and use this ability to select what to assert (when we have in mind a message to convey). Not violating a certain norm-type by making an assertion delivered in a setext yields compliance with it. Overall assertibility by S of Asi that he delivered in a setext STXi amounts to its compliance with the cumulative impact of the norms operative in STXi.​[10]​ Very often in Philosophy assertibility is construed as ‘warranted assertibility’, where the warrant in question is epistemic. Here we broaden the spectrum to allow for various other operative norms – not just epistemic norms. We are able to detect degrees of Overall Assertibility (degrees of overall compliance) as well as degree of non-Overall assertibility (as in degrees of violation). If Epistemic Assertibility can be represented on a single axis,​[11]​ then the speaker’s being able to tell that she has a Warranted Belief that p, or that she Knows that p, or that she is certain that p, represent different thresholds on the axis of Epistemic Assertibility. Overall Assertibility of Asi by S at STX1 and degrees thereof reflect an Overall Assertibility function that depends, as arguments, on the sub-normative degrees of assertibility by S of Asi for each of the operative sub-norms (at STX1). This function can be modeled in an n-dimensional (qualitative) normative vector space as a certain superposition of sub-normative assertibility functions (for the distinct types of operative sub-norms, represented by the different axes, but it need not reflect standard vectorial addition).​[12]​
    Speakers steer addressees towards certain actions by, among others, making assertions, with accompanying transmitted Steering Thrusts,​[13]​ which come with degrees (of ‘urgency’). Steered-to actions and accompanying Steering Thrusts form the content of implicit messages in ADP. Conveying Steering Thrust assertorically can be facilitated verbally by various auxiliary pragmatic operators (e.g., I am sure that p), and/or by intonation, but also by bodily gestures and facial expressions.​[14]​ The implicit content in ADP​[15]​ consists of degrees of Steering Thrust towards an steered-to action. They are encoded by S and decoded by D. Such encoding and decoding of implicit contents come in degrees of communicational success. The encoding mechanism consists in the ways of selecting a likely enough assertion Asi for D to decode correctly, via it, the steered-to action. 
Part III: Formal Pragmatics of sub-normative Superposition and Overall Assertibility
   An Overall Assertibility model 𝕆𝔸 is:  
𝕆𝔸 = <STX1, OPN, AsM, AM, OAy>,
or, in greater detail:
𝕆𝔸 = 
=<STX1{STP1,CC1,CPs,S,D,},OPN{EPN,IN},AsM{Asi},AM{Aj},OAy{EAy,IAy,FOAy,F2OAy}>,
where the components of the model are the following:
1. STX1 is a setext, STP1 is a setup, CC1 is a Conversational Context, such that: 
STX1 = {STP1,CC1}. In it is the set CPs = {CPj} of Conversational Participants, and specifically,
in our case, just two -- S and D; i.e.: S, D ε CC1 ε STX1.
2. OPN is the set of operative norms in STX1. We’ll assume here only two operative norms (types): Epistemic norms, abbreviated as EPN, and Instrumental norms, abbreviated as IN.​[16]​
3.  AsM is {Asi} – a set of pertinent assertions (likely to be invoked in STX1) -- an ‘Assertoric Menu’, available to S​[17]​ in STX1.   
   S and D have a menu AM -- a set {Aj} of pertinent actions that are ‘on the table’ (likely to be invoked in STX1), available to D in STX1. 
4. Epistemic Assertibility (of p, by x, in STX1)​[18]​ (abbreviated as: EAy) amounts to p’s being Epistemically Assertible by x at the setext,​[19]​ and is determined by a binary EAy function.​[20]​ Analogously, Instrumental Assertibility (of p, by x, in STX1) (abbreviated as: IAy) amounts to p’s being Instrumentally Assertible by x in STX1, and is determined by a binary IAy function.​[21]​ EAy and IAy come with polarity (positive or negative), and with a degree, which can be presented by a non-binary function.​[22]​ Epistemic assertibility governs roughly what a speaker may assert in STX1, epistemically speaking. Instrumental assertibility governs what a speaker may (and/or should (or shouldn’t)) assert in STX1, instrumentally speaking.​[23]​ 
5. Overall Assertibility is abbreviated as: OAy. An Overall Assertibility function FOAy is a superposition of the sub-normative Assertibility functions, for the operative norms in STX1, which determines the degree of Overall Assertibility of p by S (or D) at STX1.​[24]​ The FOAy function projects a derivative binary function F2OAy, yielding whether or not S (or D) has Overall Assertibility (for Asi in STX1), i.e., whether FOAy(S,Asi,STX1) > tA (where tA is the assertibility​[25]​ threshold), which, if it holds, determines that F2OAy(S,Asi,STX1) = 1.
Part IV: Action-Directed Pragmatics 
Implicitudes       In order to try not to replace the Gricean’s terminology of implicatures, I call ‘implicitudes’ a much larger set of transmitted pragmatic implicit messages (or contents), partly covering Gricean implicatures, but whose characterization pursues a very different methodology (while setting aside Grice’s maxims and the social picture they presuppose). The project here is to model implicitudes in ADP.  


Part V: Formal Action-Directed Pragmatics   
𝔸𝔻𝕀  is an ADI-model, where ‘ADI’ abbreviates: Action-Directed Implicitudes.
𝔸𝔻𝕀 = <STX,OPN,AsM,AM,OAy,PIM,ADC,FADC,FST>.
The formal model thus focuses on the procedures for encoding ADIs, from S’s perspective, and for decoding them, from D’s perspective. The 𝔸𝔻𝕀 model combines both perspectives – as a union of two respective models: 𝔸𝔻𝕀 (S) and  𝔸𝔻𝕀 (D):
   𝔸𝔻𝕀 = 𝔸𝔻𝕀(S)  U  𝔸𝔻𝕀(D) =
 =  <STX,OPN,AsM,AM,OAy(S),OAy(D),   
                                           PIM,FOA(S,D),FADC(S),FADC(D),FST(S),FST(D),ADC(S),ADC(D)>.
   An 𝔸𝔻𝕀(S) model -- an 𝔸𝔻𝕀 model for a speaker S, is:
𝔸𝔻𝕀(S) = <STX,OPN,AsM,AM,OAy(S),PIM,FOA(S,D),FST(S),ADC(S)>,
and an 𝔸𝔻𝕀(D) model -- an ADI-model for addressee D, is:
𝔸𝔻𝕀(D) = <STX,OPN,AsM,AM,OAy(D),PIM,FOA(S,D),FST(D),ADC(D)>,
where the components of these models are as follows:
1. STX, OPN, AsM, AM and OAy are as explained in the 𝕆𝔸 model above. S and D share the OAy function, but may assess its arguments differently for a subject in a setext. 
2. PIM is a common menu of ‘Impending’​[26]​‘saturated’ Practical Inferences  {PI(AsM,AM,STX1)j}, available for selection by S and D  in STX1  (given AsM and AM). A ‘saturated’ Practical Inference in STX1 is, roughly, one where the premises ‘carry with them’ their degree of assertibility (by the subject employing the Practical Inference). If it’s higher than the Assertibility threshold tA (which I take for granted here), then the subject is ‘settled’ on it – is in a position to assert it. 
3. FOA(S,D) is a pair of Overall Source-Assertibility functions <FOAS,FOAD>.  FOAS(S,D,As1,STX1) is S’s assessment of D’s assessment of the degree to which S has Overall Assertibility for As1 in AsM in STX1 (given S’s having asserted As1). D can be expected to assess S’s contribution as an epistemic source to D vis-à-vis his assertion As1 (in STX1), weighted by D’s assessment of potential pertinent instrumental motivations​[27]​ of S that might have weighed in (in STX1, and specifically with her as his addressee) and by D’s independently acquired degree of Overall Assertibility for As1 (in STX1) – all by way of D’s simulating S’s simulating D.​[28]​   And analogously for FOAD(S,As1,STX1)  --  D’s simulation of S’s simulation of D’s degree of Overall Assertibility for As1 given S’s assertion of As1.​[29]​ These functions are used by S and D respectively to assess how viable a certain Practical Inference (with As1 as a premise and A1 in the conclusion) is likely to look in D’s eyes (as modeling S), from S’s perspective, and in S’s eyes (as modeling D), from D’s perspective. D simulates S in order to figure out S’s steered-to action, and S simulates D in order to select what it’s best for him to assert. These two functions figure in the embedded modeling of S by D and of D by S. 
4. FST(S) is S’s transmitted Steering Thrust accompanying his assertion As1 in STX1. FST(D) is S’s transmitted Steering Thrust accompanying S’s asserting As1 as construed (decoded) by D. 
5.  ADC(S,As1,STX1), of for short: ADC(S), is S’s transmitted action-directed content (which includes the polarity and degree of the accompanied Steering Thrust), and ADC(D) is the action-directed content as construed by the addressee D.​[30]​ 
6.  FADC(S) is the function that determines in STX1 just S’s steered-to action (which is given, in S’s perspective), and accordingly, as construed by D -- FADC(D). 


Summary: The Coding Mechanism:
   So, in sum, the simulation of encoding and decoding implicit messages in ADP is, roughly, as follows:
   S attempts, in STX1, to select an assertion As1 that can figure as a major premise in a saturated Practical Inference with S’s steered-to action A1 specified in its conclusion that D is likely to readily come up with upon hearing S’s assertion As1 (in STX1), and which, from D’s perspective, S is likely to consider as ‘viable’​[31]​ (the analogue of ‘valid and sound’ in deductive logic),​[32]​ and accordingly with As1 as Overall Assertible.​[33]​ 
   S then asserts a ‘good enough’ As1 of this type. S selects auxiliary operators (such as ‘I know that p’, I am not sure that p’, or ‘It might be that not p’) to signal the polarity and degree of his Steering Thrust for As1, together with an intonational pattern, bodily gestures and facial expressions to further modulate it.
   D attempts to decode the implicit content* conveyed by S’s assertion of As1 (at STX1) by ‘reverse engineering’ simulation of S’s selection procedure of S’s assertion As1 (at STX1), via an ‘impending’​[34]​ saturated Practical Inference (at STX1) that has As1 as a major premise. Its conclusion specifies what D would then conclude S’s steered-to action to be. D considers the above auxiliary operators, S’s intonational pattern, bodily gestures and facial expression accompanying S’s assertion As1 to assess S’s polarity and degree of Steering Thrust communicated with his assertion As1 (at STX1).​[35]​ 
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^1	  In a simple case.    This research project was financially supported by the State of Lower Saxony, Germany.
^2	  For an expanded explanation of Setexts, see my “From an Encoding Outlook of Action-Directed Pragmatics to Epistemic Contextualism” (draft).
^3	  Conveying the action in question is a part of S’s transmitting this implicit content.
^4	  Or at least certain parts of pragmatics – I here focus on ADP.
^5	  Locke employed the conception of coding, but for a different purpose: His conception is of communication as enabling speakers to encode thoughts into words and listeners to decode words back into thought. This seems to be, presumably, an encoding conception via a conception of words as expressing those thoughts. To me, it seems like a conception centering on semantics, which is not my concern here. Further, the thoughts of speakers and listeners are at the heart of this Locke’s conception. From my perspective, pragmatics deals just with the transmitted messages – the speaker delivers a produce: his assertoric act, which conveys a transmitted message. And the pragmatic task here is to tell what implicit message this assertoric act conveys to the addressee, and what and how is the addressee able to decode out of it. The speaker is screened off once his assertoric act is delivered (in the setext). His thoughts are not the subject-matter of pragmatics. Grice, it seems, has followed Locke in focusing on ‘communicational intentions’. For me, communicative intentions of the speaker’s or his other intentions are not, strictly speaking, part of pragmatics, even if this is what the addressee wants to become aware off: the gap between the speaker (other than what is reflected in the setext) and the transmitted message he transmitted by his assertoric act marks the end of the scope of pragmatics. Other forms of reasoning may come into play in attempting to produce conjectures regarding the speaker beyond the explicit and implicit messages conveyed by his assertoric act, but they are not part of pragmatics, certainly not of linguistic pragmatics. See also Wilson and Sperber for a line that seems to conflict with my attempt here to cordon off linguistic pragmatic from intentional communication that, on my view, merely includes it as a separate computational module. Intentional communication here, construed broadly, covers the speaker’s intentions of which his transmitted message may be indicative, thus opening a way to reason about them.
^6	  I limit the scope of the Action-Directed Pragmatics proposed here to assertions only, and I do not here attempt to extend it to other speech acts.
^7	  Compare to acquiring a functioning ‘black box’ (or a gadget), easy to use, but where the design of the black box may be anything but trivial. Such cases may be taken to be ‘conventionalized’, with a story of repetitive use that entrench it as such.
^8	  We deal here just with assertions.
^9	  Even if tentative.
^10	  And more specifically, with the message conveyed by S’s asserting Asi.
^11	  I.e., represented as a gradable scalar. But I idealize in assuming that perhaps distinct non-commensurable sub-normative degrees can be represented by a gradable scalar vectorial component. (See my point against Stanley that knowledge supervenes on two components, which yield only partial gradability. Same applies to EAy.)
^12	  Each axis in the sub-normative vector space represents an operative sub-norm and its degrees of sub-normative assertibility of (Asi by S).
^13	  I.e., in addition to the ‘propositional content’ of the assertion.
^14	  Where the latter do not count as linguistic.
^15	  More precisely, in Action-Directed communication, of which Action-Directed pragmatics is a part. I here gloss over this distinction.
^16	  Again, in analogy to the treatment of the OAy function, with sub-normative components, we need to countenance sub-epistemic norms, each of which yields a degree of assertibility under that sub-epistemic norm, which, I take it, superimpose into an Overall Epistemic Assertibility norm (in the setexts), which we consider here as a non-binary epistemic assertibility function (in short: EAy function) that yields degree of EAy (for p, x and a setext). Again, the various sub-epistemic norms can be represented along an n-dimensional vector space with a superpositional function EAy(p) that looks like an analogue of a vector addition (with each axis representing a sub-epistemic norm), where a binary EAy(p) in the setext yields whether or not p has in it EAy (a binary function), as well as the degree of EAy it has, whether it has EAy or not. Again, the superpositional function need not fit the mold of vector addition. I skip a more detailed discussion here. (I also skip here discussions regarding the uniqueness of the decomposition of an overall EAy function into a set of component sub-epistemic norms.
^17	  And, in simple cases, to D too.
^18	  Recall that CC1 is at a certain time t1.
^19	  I.e.: its assertion is in overall compliance with the operative epistemic norms.
^20	  Compare to the Overall-Assertibility function FOAy  below.
^21	  Thus, p is instrumentally assertible when it’s instrumentally ‘worthwhile’ for x to assert p in STX1.
^22	  But given an assertibility threshold, the binary EAy function is an immediate derivative of the non-binrary one – depending on whether the degree of EAy(p) (for x in a setext) is above the assertibility threshold (and thus a with positive polarity).
^23	  Its obligatory ‘should’ is conferred to an Overall Assertibility function of which it is a component function.   Note that in many cases ‘instrumental’ is used for ‘instrumentally rational’, as in discussions of Expected Utility Theory, which relegates Epistemic Rationality, usually to Bayesian theory, and focuses on ‘Rationality’ in the sense of ‘Instrumental Rationality’. 
^24	  As by Asi. See note 2 above.
^25	  I.e., Overall Assertibility.
^26	  Roughly, one that the subject (in our case, D) is likely to ‘come up’ with given the assertion. See also note 12.
^27	  Including candor, and including the degree to which, in D’s assessment, S ‘has her back’ in STX1.
^28	  This presentation focuses on D’s attempt to figure out S’s steered-to action. If D is to consider S’s assertion as a basis to act on his steered-to action, she would have to weigh in her own epistemic position vis-à-vis p, in addition to S’s contribution in functioning as a source for her in this regard, without embedded simulation. 
^29	  See note 12. 
^30	  But see note 34 below.
^31	  More precisely: Such that D is likely to consider that S is likely to consider that D is likely to consider as viable. The above presentation, for simplicity and brevity, suppresses the due weight of embedded simulations.
^32	  The embedded simulation of the viability is even more important to the closely related task of a speaker who endeavors to steer his addressee to perform the steered-to action – not just to decipher what it is. This is also where Steering Thrust plays a major role. In this presentation I don’t fully distill the communicative task from the steering task, since they usually coincide and since steering to action is the foremost role of communicating an steered-to action: A major cue for D to identify the steered-to action is by characterizing it as an action that S is likely to want D to perform.
^33	  The thrust of the previous note applies here too.
^34	  I.e., a Practical Inference that S would consider as likely for D to come up with (‘impending’) upon hearing S’s assertion As1. 
^35	  There is hardly a difference between an oral assertion instance and its corresponding written version in determining their steered-to action, and in a written version there is no reliance on non-linguistic components. But the specification of the Steering Thrust in ADC(D) depends at least partly, usually, on non-linguistic input such as intonation/expression/gestures.    Beyond the references made in the paper, a limited bibliography will be added separately.
